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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE 
OF 
GOLDw~N W. CLUFF, SR., aka 
G. W. CLl:FF, 
Deceased. Case No. 15559 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a probate proceeding. After granting final 
discharge to the administratrix, the Fifth Judicial District 
Court in and for the County of Millard, State of Utah, reopened 
the estate and appointed the petitioner administratrix against 
her will. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court dP~ied the petitioner's motion to 
set aside the Order appointing her the administratrix against 
her will. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have the Court declare that Judge 
J. Harlan Burns of the Fifth Judicial District Court of Millard 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
County, State of Utah, does not have the power to force Aleith 
Cluff to be administratrix of the Estate of Goldwyn w. Cluff, 
Sr., deceased, because said order would be contrary to the 
Constitution of the United States, Amendment XIII, Section l, 
and the Constitution of the State of Utah, Article 1, Section 21.i 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Petitioner was appointed administratrix in the above 
entitled matter and continued to administer the estate up to 
the 15th day of January, 197 5, when the court entered a decree 
of final distribution, approved her first and final account, 
and discharged her as the administratrix. Said decree is 
attached to the petition for order granting intermediate appeal 
and designated Exhibit B. 
On the 19th day of May, 1977, the court made and 
entered an order reopening the estate and appointing Cluff 
Talbot as administrator De Bonis Non. Cluff Talbot refused to 
act. On the 31st day of May, 1977, the court made and entered 
an order discharging Cluff Talbot as administrator De Banis Non 
and ordered that Aleith Cluff continue as administratrix solely 
for the purpose of completing Fifth Judicial District Court of 
Millard County, Civil No. 6400, Sharlene Wright and Jay Wright, 
Plaintiffs, vs. Aleith Cluff, Administratrix of the Estate of 
Goldwyn W. Cluff, Sr., Defendant. 
Aleith Cluff has refused to act as administratrix and 
-2-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
has petitioned the court to set aside said order. 
The court has refused to set aside the order but has 
stayed 311 proceedings in this matter until Aleith Cluff petitiones 
the Court for an order allowing an appeal on this interlocutory 
order or decision. 
On the 16th day of June, 1977, Ray H. Ivie, attorney 
for Aleith Cluff, prepared the motion and order and mailed them 
to Judge J. Harlan Burns. Sai. motion and order is attached to 
the petition for order granting intermediate appeal and designated 
Exhibit C. 
Thereafter Ray H. Ivie checked with the Judge's office 
several times and was eventually advised that the motion and 
order had apparently been lost in the mail. 
On September 19, 1977, Ray H. Ivie prepared the motion 
and order again and mailed them to Judge J. Harlan Burns. Said 
motion and order is attached to the petition for order granting 
intermediate appeal and designated Exhibit D. 
Thereafter, on November 26, 1977, Ray H. Ivie received 
a copy of the signed order, a copy of which is attached to the 
petition for order granting intermediate appeal and designated 
Exhihit E. Ray H. Ivie thereafter discovered that the order 
must have been signed in June, 1977, and left with the County 
Clerk. A copy of said order is attached to the petit~on for order 
granting intermediate appeal and designated Exhibit F. 
The Clerk has now advised Ray H. Ivie that Judge J. 
-3-
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Harlan Burns asked him to notify Ray H. Ivie of the signing 
and filing of the motion and order. 
In the mail of December 5, 1977, Ray H. Ivie · receive( 
1 
a notice, dated November 22, 1977. A copy of the envelope is 
attached to the petition for order granting intermediate app~l 
and designated Exhibit G, and a copy of the notice is attached 
to the petition for order granting intermediate appeal and 
designated Exhibit H. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
COMPELLING THE PETITIONER TO SERVE AS ADMINISTRATRIX 
IS A VIOLATION OF HER CONSTITIJTIONAL RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM 
INVOLUNTARY SERVITIJDE. 
The Constitution of the United States, Amendment XIII,' 
Section 1, provides as follows: 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except 
as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall 
have been duly convicted, shall exist within the 
United States, or any place subject to their juris-
diction. 
The Constitution of the State of Utah, Article 1, 
Section 21, provides as follows: 
Neither slavery or involuntary servitude, e :cept 1 as a punishment for crime, whereof the party sh~l 
have been duly convicted, shall exist within this 
State. 
+-
l 
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The Thirteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution 
and ArLicle 1, Section 21, of the Utah State Constitution not 
only abolish the institution of slavery, but both provisions 
go further and abolish "involuntary servitude". The essence 
of involuntary servitude is that a worker is compelled by law 
or force to labor against his will for the benefit of another. 
See Hodges v. United States, 203 US l. 
No issue of involuntary servitude arises when the 
complaining party has been lawfully convicted of a crime and 
imprisoned as a result thereof. Similarly, it has not been 
held to be a violation of involuntary servitude to enforce upon 
the citizens of this nation the duties they owe to the state. 
Involuntary servitude is not imposed upon an individual for 
compelling him to serve in the military, Selective Draft Law 
Cases, 245 US 366, (1918), or for the imposition of a penalty 
for the nonpayment of taxes, Weber v. New York 18 Misc 2d 543, 
195 NYS 2d 269, (1959). However, the application of the above 
mentioned cases has been limit d to the circumstances of public 
duty and responsibility and has never been extended to the area 
of private litigation and the imposition by the court of a burden 
or responsibility on an individual to affirmatively administer 
an estate. Compelling the petitioner to administer the estate 
of Goldwyn W. Cluff, Sr., forces her to work against her will 
for the benefit of another. 
The Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
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United States prevents the Court from enforcing involunlary 
servitude on any person, including attorneys who have historical:' 
been considered officers of the Court. See United States of Ame:. 
v. Lesser, 233 F Supp. 535 (1961) reversed on other grounds 335 
F2d. 832 (1964). Regarding the issue of compelling a member of 
the Bar to represent an indigent defendant the court states: 
Much has been heard concerning civil rights 
these days, but somehow or another people seem to 
overlook the provisions of the Thirteenth Amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States which rea~ 
as follows: 
"Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary 
servitude, except as a punishment for crime 
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, 
shall exist within the United States, or any 
place subject to their jurisdiction." 
Any statute of California or of the United States 
which is contrary to that amendment is void. The 
Sixth Amendment to the Constitution which prescribes 
that an accused shall "enjoy the right * * * to have 
the Assistance of Counsel for his defense," is just 
as much modified by the Thirteenth Amendment as all I 
other parts of the Constitution which permitted 
slavery. 
While the Court is mindful of the high duty of ' 
every member of the Bar to serve those who are opprwd 
it has no more power to compel a member of the Baro-_! 
the State of California to do the tremendous amount o: 
work and put in the tremendous amount of time it would_ 
require to conscientiously examine the files and recorc 
in this case, and represent the defendants on appeal, 
and thus compel involuntary servitude by a lawyer to 
convicted criminals, than I have to make an order com· 
pelling these defendants, had they not been convicted'. 
to pick cotton for a private individual. This lack. 0; 
power is implicitly recognized in Section 1915 of.T1t1' 
28 U.S. Code, inasmuch as that Section does notg1ve 
the Court the power to appoint, or assign, or com~~ 
or coerce an attorney to represent anyone, but mere 
gives the Court the power to request an attorney to 00 
so. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also made declarations 
regarding involuntary servitude. In McGrew v. Industrial (,cl!IC;;': I 
! 
-6- l_ 
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85 1'2d 608 (1938), the plaintiffs seek to have the Utah 
Minimum Wage Law declared void. They brought the action to 
enjoin the Industrial Commission from enforcing its order 
fixitig minimum wages and maximum hours for women and minors 
engaged in retail trades. Speaking with respect to the 
property rights held by the plaintiffs the court said: 
..... The right to work, the right to engage in 
gainful occupations, the right to receive com-
pensation for one's work are essentially property 
rights ......... But no man can have a vested interest 
in the work or labor of another. He has no right in 
law to insist that another must work for him. Such 
right would amount to involuntary servitude or slavery 
and be in violation of Section 21 of Article l of the 
State Constitution. Labor is not a mere commodity to 
be bought and sold upon the market but is part of the 
warp and woof of the life of the laborer. The employer 
is entitled to have to own, and use the result of the 
effort, energy and t0il of his employee. That right 
is his property. But the activity exerted, the energy 
used, the strength expended and the skill applied 
belong to the workman. They are part of his body, 
part of his life and can neither be bought nor sold. 
One's body and life are his own and he cannot be 
required to yield up either except at his own desire, 
the call of his country, or the decree of his God. 
In and to those things no one else can acquire any 
rights whatsoever. 
In 1968 the Utah Supreme Court made two significant 
statements with respect to the rights of lawyers as they were 
called upon to serve or represent indigent clients. In Washington 
County v. Day, 447 P2d 189, 22 Utah 2d 6, (1968), the appellant 
petitioned the Supreme Court of Utah to prohibit the enforcement 
Jc of an order granting the defendant's request for an investigator 
at county expense. Speaking of the court's inherent power to 
prevent the miscarriage of justice and to watch over the rights 
-7-
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of the impecunious defendant the court said: 
However, it must not be understood that lawyers 
alone among all the professions can be compelled 
by the legislative authority to undertake free . 
services for impecunious people. The lawyer has j 
the same rights as the doctor, the public accountant ' 
or the surveyor. None of them can be compelled by 'I 
the law to render services for free. 
In Bedford v. Salt Lake County, 447 P2d 193, 22 Utah 2d 12, 
p. 194-195, the Supreme Court was again called on to decide 
fate of lawyers when rendering services to indigent clients. 
Although the court held that a lawyer should represent the 
client and accept his assignment from the court as a part of 
his professional responsibility, the holding was clear in statir.' 
that the reason the lawyer would serve an indigent client for 
free is due to his relationship with the court and that the 
leg is la tu re could no more req· ire a lawyer to represent a 
client free than it could compel a physician to treat a sick 
or injured indigent patient without pay. 
For the legislature to attempt to compel a lawyer 
to work by passing a statute requiring the judge 
to order it done would be to take his property 
without giving just compensation, or to impose a 
form of involuntary servitude upon him. 
Forcing the petitioner in the present case to serve 
as administratrix against her will is a clear violation of her 
constitutional right to be free from involuntary servitude. 
The District Court had no power to gain jurisdiction over t~ 
petitioner and require that she affirmatively take actions as 
administratrix, to do so would force her to serve against her 
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L 
will for the benefit of another. 
POINT II 
THE POWER OF THE PROBATE COURTS TO APPOINT ADMIN-
ISTRATORS IS A POWER CONFERRED BY STATUTE AND BY NO OTHER 
METHOD. 
Consent is an essential requirement to the appointment 
of an it1dividual as an administrator of an estate. Accord~ 'g 
to the laws of Utah and the statutory grant of authority given 
the probate court, a judge can only issue letters of administration 
after the appointee takes and subscribes to an oath that he will 
perform occording to the laws and duties of an administrator. 
Section 75-5-1 U.C.A. 1953. This statute was applicable to the 
facts of this case because the order appointing Aleith Cluff 
administratrix was entered on May 31, 1977, a month prior to 
the effective date of the new Utah probate code. Incidentally, 
under the new probate code, the administrator must still file 
an answer with the court consenting to the appointment. Utah 
Uniform Probate Code 75-3-601, 75-3-602 (1977). 
Section 75-5-1 U.C.A. 1953 states: 
Before letters testamentary or of administration or 
of guardianship are issued the executor, administrator 
or guardian must take and subscribe an oath that he 
will perform according to law the duties of executor, 
administrator or gua~dian, which oath must be attached 
to the letters. All letters testamentary, of admin-
istration and of guardianship issued to, and all bonds 
executed by, executors, administrators or guardians, 
-9-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
with the affidavits and certificates thereon, must be i 
forthwith recorded by the clerk of the court having 
jurisdiction of the estate, in books to be kept by 
him in his office for that purpose. 
Section 75-12-19 U.C.A. (1953) states: 
When the estate has been fully administered, and it 
is shown by the executor or administrator, by the 
production of satisfactory vouchers, that he has 
paid all sums of money due from him, and delivered 
under the order of the court all the property of the 
estate to the parties entitled, and performed all the 
acts lawfully required of him, the court must make a 
judgment or decree discharging him from all liability 
to be incurred thereafter. 
On January 15, 1975, Aleith Cluff was discharged as 
administratrix of the estate of Goldwyn W. Cluff, Sr., in the 
same proceeding the judge entered a decree of final distribut~n 
and approved her first and final account. According to Sectioo 
75-12-19 U .C.A. (1953), the administratrix or personal represent· 
ative is discharged from all liability to be incurred after final! 
discharge. Consequently, when the Honorable J. Harlan Burns 
entered the order appointing petitioner as administratrix on May 
31, 1977, such action constituted a reopening of the estate and 
the appointment of the petitioner as administratrix would be vat:: 
and binding only by satisfying the statutory requirement of conse: 
by the appointee and the taking of an oath as required by Section! 
75-5-1 U.C.A. (1953). Petitioner never consented to the appo~t· 
ment as administratrix and has never taken the oath as required 
by the above mentioned Code section, as a result, the court is 
without jurisdiction and has no power to appoint the petitioner 
administratrix without complying with the statutory grant of 
-10-
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authority. Sec Wink v. Marshall, 392 P2d 768, (Oregon 1964). 
POINT III 
PUBLIC POLICY REQUIRES THAT AN ADMINISTRATOR CONSENT 
TO HIS APPOINTMENT BEFORE LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION BE ISSUED 
AND AUTHORITY TO BIND THE ESTATE BECOMES EFFECTIVE. 
The administration of estates is a very sensative and 
delicate area of civil litigation. Administrators serve as 
fiduciaries and as such owe a strict duty of care and honesty 
to all those involved in the probate of an estate. To compel 
an individual to serve as an administrator against his will and 
for the Denefit of those to whom he has no obligation would be a 
flagrant violation of public policy. For the protection of heirs, 
creditors and the public in general, an administrator should not 
be forced to serve but should be allowed to serve only after con-
senting to requirements of the office and taking an oath swearing 
to perform in accordance with the rules governing estate admin-
istration. 
In the case at bar, Aleith Cluff was appointed admin-
istratrix against her will and without taking an oath to adhere 
tu the rules of administration, to compel her to serve the estate 
of Goldwyn w. Cluff, Sr., would be in direct conflict with the 
clearly established public pol·~y of requiring administrators to 
assume and function in a fiduciary relationship with all those 
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concerned in the estate. 
CONCLUSION 
Forcing Aleith Cluff to serve as administratrix 
against her will violates her constitutional right to be free 
from involuntary servitude, circumvents the statutory authoritJ 
granted the probate court to appoint administrators only within 
the bounds of legislative authority and violates the logic of 
public policy demanding a fiduciary obligation imposed on admin· 
istrators. 
Petitioner contends that the Honorable J. Harlan Burns 
was in error in appointing her as administratrix against her will. 
Petitioner requests the Supreme Court to set aside the order~ 
May 31, 1977, appointing her as the administratrix of the estate I 
of Goldwyn W. Cluff, Sr. G 
Respectfully submitted this <t..!!3! day of February, 1978. / 
Appellant 
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